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Abstract
Meta-objects are used to factor the speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst asynchronous, proactive,
secret-sharing protocol into secret-sharing, replication and encryption layers. A
search strategy is described that exploits the structure of the speciﬁcation to reduce
the search space.
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1 Introduction
The demands on software systems are ever increasing. They should be dis-
tributed, reliable, adaptable, secure and more. Designing and reasoning about
such systems is very diﬃcult, and much can be at stake. To help manage this
complexity Maude [1] brings into the formal arena object-orientation, inher-
itance, richly parameterized modules and user-deﬁnable syntax. To provide
further means of modularizing, adapting and reusing formal speciﬁcations,
meta-objects have been given a rewriting semantics [2]. Case studies can be
useful in gaining experience in the judicious combination of these means. The
work described here is an attempt in that direction.
COCA [7] is a fault-tolerant and secure on-line certiﬁcation authority that
has very weak assumptions, thus reducing its vulnerability. To maintain the
private key used for signing certiﬁcates and responses the ﬁrst asynchronous
proactive secret-sharing protocol (APSS) was developed, which is the protocol
described here.
In [6] it is described by a sequence of versions with increasingly weaker as-
sumptions. The development of the speciﬁcation and this presentation follow
in those steps. Section 2 introduces secret sharing. The notions of objects and
meta-objects in Maude, which are used to represent the system, are brieﬂy
described in Section 3. The ﬁrst version of the protocol is presented in Sec-
tion 4, introducing the basic structure of the speciﬁcation. Sections 5 and 6
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describe modiﬁcations that obtain the next versions of the protocol. The cor-
rectness criteria for the protocol are deﬁned in Section 7. Section 8 describes
a search strategy that exploits the layered structure of the speciﬁcation. A
brief conclusion follows.
2 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing resolves the tension between the availability and the secrecy of
a secret by distributing a secret to multiple servers in such a way that it is
disclosed only if some of these servers are compromised. One particular scheme
is (n, t + 1) secret sharing, deﬁned by the operations split and reconstruct.
Split generates from a secret a random set of n shares, called a sharing, while
reconstruct obtains the secret from any subset of a sharing with more than
threshold t shares.
A secret sharing is called standard if the shares are single values. In [6]
Zhou describes the construction of an (n, t + 1) combinatorial secret sharing
from an (l, l) standard secret sharing, with l =
(
n
t
)
. Sets P1, . . . , Pl of t
servers represent the worst-case failure scenarios. Given a sharing s1, . . . , sl
of a secret, each share si is associated with failure scenario Pi. The share for
server p of the (n, t+1) secret sharing of the same secret, called the share set
of p and denoted Sp, is deﬁned by si ∈ Sp ⇔ p /∈ Pi. More abstractly, to every
server p there corresponds an index set Ip such that i ∈ Ip ⇔ p /∈ Pi.
The secret-sharing protocol presented in [6] employs combinatorial (n, t+1)
secret sharing to maintain a secret. The next section presents very brieﬂy the
notions of object and meta-object in Maude, which will be used to represent
servers and to separate diﬀerent aspects of the protocol.
3 Objects and MetaObjects
A distributed object-oriented system is represented in Maude [4] as a term
of sort Configuration, which has subsorts Object and Msg. Conﬁgurations
are built by a multiset union operator, with a state of a distributed system
described by a term:
M1 . . .Mm < O1 : C1|atts1 > . . . < On : Cn|attsn > .
TheMs are messages, and the other terms give the states of objects named Oi
of class Ci, with the values of their attributes given in atts i, for i = 1, . . . , n.
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The dynamics of the system is speciﬁed by rewrite rules, whose most gen-
eral form is
r : M1 . . .Mm < O1 : C1|atts1 > . . . < On : Cn|attsn >
→ < Oi1 : C ′i1 |atts ′i1 > . . . < Oin : C ′in|atts ′in >
< Q1 : D1|atts ′′1 > . . . < Qp : Dp|atts ′′p > M ′1 . . .M ′q
if Cond .
This rule, labelled by r, states that if the condition Cond holds the messages
M are consumed; some of the original objects O persist with new states and
possibly new classes C ′, and new objects Q and messages M ′ emerge. Maude
supports the convention that a rule need not mention attributes of an object
that are irrelevant for that rule.
To represent more complex entities there is the notion of meta-object,
which is given a rewriting semantics in [2]. Diﬀerent communication services
can be represented by diﬀerent meta-objects, and can be composed by stacking
the corresponding meta-objects, perhaps subject to some interface constraints.
These stackable objects must be deﬁned in a subclass of MetaObject, a
class that allows messages to move down, and conﬁguration requests, which
are multisets of requests for message transmittal or object creation, to move
up. MetaObject has ﬁve attributes: base, which identiﬁes the meta-object at
the bottom of the stack; and four lists of data that allow communication with
neighboring meta-objects and the environment. Messages from above or the
outside are imported into in; down holds the messages to be exported; up holds
conﬁguration requests imported from below; out, those being exported. In the
speciﬁcation presented here, MetaObject departs from the above description
in that the importing lists are replaced by multisets.
A MetaStack is a list of MetaObjects, all of which have the same base,
and whose last meta-object is the one identiﬁed as the base. A term of sort
MetaTower has the form {MS }, where MS is a meta-stack. MetaStack and
MetaTower are subsorts of Configuration.
The next section presents the ﬁrst model of APSS. A conﬁguration of
meta-towers, objects and messages describes the state of the system. .
4 APSS with a Single Coordinator
This ﬁrst protocol assumes a benign environment. It is an asynchronous pro-
tocol that has no bound on either the server speed, the message delay, or the
local clock drift. Its goal is to proactively replace one sharing of a secret, col-
lectively held by n servers, with another sharing of the same secret. A sharing
is produced during one run or instance of the protocol and destroyed during
the next run. To know the secret an adversary must obtain enough shares of
a sharing to reconstruct it. Thus, the window of vulnerability is the duration
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Fig. 1. Share Refreshing
of two consecutive runs. The protocol assumes that during this time no more
than t servers are ever compromised. It further requires n ≥ 3t+1. This ﬁrst
version assumes adversaries are passive. A compromised server can experience
only crash failures, disclosing locally stored information to adversaries. Links
are assumed to be reliable, delivering every message to its intended recipient;
an adversary may only eavesdrop on links.
4.1 Share Refreshing
An (n, t+ 1) combinatorial secret sharing is built on top of an (l, l) standard
secret sharing, with l =
(
n
t
)
. Each server holds a standard share for each
index in its index set. To replace a sharing s1, . . . , sl, each of the shares is
split, and the resulting subshares are reconstructed, as shown in Figure 1, to
obtain s′1, . . . , s
′
l.
The protocol has each uncompromised server split its shares. As each standard
share is held by multiple servers, and the split operation is nondeterministic,
it requires a coordinator to select the subsharings for the next sharing. This
version assumes the coordinator is immune to attacks.
The syntax of the basic secret-sharing operations is given by
op split : MachineInt Label SplitId Secret -> NeSetOfShares .
op construct : MachineInt Label NeListOfShares -> Share? .
Both require the length of a sharing, and both label their result. Since split
is nondeterministic split ids distinguish diﬀerent applications. The protocol
does not ever reconstruct the maintained secret. construct obtains a Share,
which is a Secret, from a list of shares which must have the length of a
sharing; otherwise, it returns errorShare.
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Indexed sets of shares represent share sets of servers, and the collection of
subshares they get. The basic operations are overloaded to operate on them.
op split : MachineInt Label MachineInt Oid NeISetOfShares
-> SubsharesLabels .
Each of the shares si in the indexed set having the given label L is split into a
(sub)sharing of the length given by the ﬁrst argument and labelled by L◦i◦O,
where O is the fourth argument, the name of the server performing the split.
Each resulting sharing is further identiﬁed by a split id composed of the name
of the server and a split count, which starts at the third argument.
op construct : MachineInt Label NeListOfLabels NeISetOfShares
-> NeISetOfShares .
A new share set is produced by construct, whose precondition requires, for
each index in the given indexed set, shares with each of the labels in the list,
which must have the length given in the ﬁrst argument. The resulting shares
are labelled with the given label.
Operations to collect shares and delete all shares or all but those with some
given label are introduced.
op _+>_ : NeISetOfShares NeISetOfShares -> NeISetOfShares .
op _>- : NeISetOfShares -> NeISetOfShares .
op _>-‘[_‘] : NeISetOfShares Label -> NeISetOfShares .
4.2 APSS and MetaObjects
The asynchronous, proactive secret-sharing protocol is about splitting and
constructing shares, but the replication and encryption required complicate it
much. This speciﬁcation factors these aspects into diﬀerent meta-objects.
4.2.1 Secret-sharing Layer
The base layer captures the properly secret-sharing part of the protocol. The
servers are holders of a sharing of a secret, and the coordinator guides them
as they replace it. Messages are kept to a minimum and simple.
This section describes an asynchronous object rewrite theory, one whose
rules have one object and at most one message on the left-hand side, which
can then be transformed into a meta-object theory as described in [2].
Known to each participant or principal of a run is the length of a sharing
and the version of the current one. Its status may be either up or down.
class Principal | sharing-length : MachineInt,
status : Status, current-version-number : MachineInt .
class Server |
split-count : MachineInt, runs : SetOfRuns,
shares : ISetOfShares, subshares : ISetOfShares .
subclass Server < Principal .
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class Coordinator | run-in-progress : Bool,
chose : Bool, propagated-subsharings : PropagatedSubsharings .
subclass Coordinator < Principal .
It is convenient to distinguish between the identity and the behavior of
a principal. Thus, only objects of the following classes participate in the
protocol.
class ActiveServer . subclass ActiveServer < Server .
class ActiveCoordinator . subclass ActiveCoordinator < Coordinator .
The coordinator starts a run by instructing all servers to split their shares.
rl [init-run] :
[ < C : ActiveCoordinator |
status : up, run-in-progress : false,
chose : false, current-version-number : V > Conf ]
=> [ < C : ActiveCoordinator | run-in-progress : true >
( all <| C |< init(label(V)) ) Conf ] .
The syntax for the communications exchanged is given by
sorts MsgPkt ConfReq SMsg Message .
sorts Id AId . subsorts Oid AId < Id .
subsort MsgPkt < ConfReq < Msg . subsort SMsg < Msg .
op _|<_ : Id Message -> SMsg . op _<|_ : Id Msg -> MsgPkt .
op __ : ConfReq ConfReq -> ConfReq [assoc comm id: none] .
To abstract the replication from the secret-sharing part of the protocol terms
of sort AId are used to represent one or more concrete objects, which are
identiﬁed by terms of sort Oid. Above, all is used to represent all the servers.
Abstract messages will be translated into messages to concrete objects by the
replication meta-object.
As each server receives the instruction from the coordinator, it splits its
shares with the speciﬁed label, and sends the subshares to the holders that
should have them (see Figure 1) and the labels of the sharings produced to
the coordinator.
crl [contribute] :
[ < Srv : ActiveServer |
status : up, runs : Rs,
current-version-number : V, split-count : Cnt,
sharing-length : Len, shares : Ss >
( Srv <| C |< init(L) ) Conf ]
=> [ < Srv : ActiveServer | runs : Rs U (L, only-old),
split-count : Cnt
+ size(labels(split(Len, L, Cnt, Srv, Ss))) >
{# ( holders <| Srv |<
establish(subshares(split(Len, L, Cnt, Srv, Ss)))) #}
( C <| Srv |<
contribute(labels(split(Len, L, Cnt, Srv, Ss)))) Conf ]
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if L == label(V) .
The syntax op ‘{#_#‘} : ConfReq -> ConfReq is used to bracket messages
that must be transformed as a unit. A series of replications, simpliﬁcations
and coalitions transform the one message to holders into one message to
holders-of(I), for I = 1, . . . , Len, with just the subshares that a server with
I in its index set should have. holders and holders-of(I) are of sort AId.
When the coordinator has received enough labels, at least one per index,
it chooses l (sharing-length Len in the speciﬁcation) of them to specify the
subsharings to be used to construct the new sharing, and sends them to all
servers. When a server has all the subshares it needs, it constructs its new
share set, and sends the coordinator a computed(L) message, where L is the
label with the new version number.
The coordinator must wait for a quorum of 2t+1 computed messages from
diﬀerent servers before concluding that the new sharing has been installed.
The replication meta-object for the coordinator collects these messages, and
when the quorum is reached, sends down (the message corresponding to)
C <| comp-quorum |< computed(L),
where comp-quorum is of sort AId. After updating the current version number
and resetting other attributes, the coordinator sends
all <| C |< finished(L),
which instructs servers to update the current version number and delete old
shares and all the subshares.
4.2.2 Replication Layer
As described, some messages have an abstract recipient or sender, representing
a set of actual principals. It is the task of the replication meta-object to
translate between abstract and concrete messages.
Motivated by this example a somewhat general parameterized replication
meta-object can be deﬁned. As conﬁguration requests move up they may be
replicated, and as messages come down they may be ﬁltered if recognized to
be contributing to a quorum.
(oth REPL is including META-STACK .
sorts ReplicatorMap QuorumMap Filter .
class Replicator | replicator-map : ReplicatorMap,
filter : Filter, quorum-map : QuorumMap .
subclass Replicator < MetaObject .
*** operator declarations
endoth)
A replicator map RM determines whether the conﬁguration request CR should
be replicated. Whatever the case, replications(RM, CR) reﬂects the trans-
formation. It may be that some of the messages produced may have the sender
as a recipient also. Thus, operations go-up and go-down select what, if any-
thing, should go in each direction. Some conﬁguration requests moving up
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may serve as requests that require a quorum of responses. As they go up they
modify a ﬁlter F, so that when the responses arrive they may be recognized
and it can be determined when the quorum is reached.
(omod REPLICATION-LAYER[R :: REPL] is
*** variable declarations
crl [one-to-many] :
< RO : Replicator.R | up : CR CRConf,
replicator-map : RM, down : Ml,
out : CRl, filter : F >
=> < RO : Replicator.R | up : CRConf,
out : CRl .*. go-up(replications(RM, CR)),
down : Ml .*. go-down(replications(RM, CR)),
filter : construct-filter(F, CR) >
if not (to-be-u-filtered(F, CR)) .
crl [many-to-one-from-above] :
< RO : Replicator.R | filter : F,
in : M MConf, down : Ml,
quorum-map : QM >
=> < RO : Replicator.R | filter : d-filter(F, M)
in : MConf, down : Ml .*. d-filtered(QM, F, M) >
if to-be-d-filtered(F, M) .
*** more rules
endom)
As messages move down through the replication layer, the ﬁlter F recognizes
any message that is a response to be counted towards a quorum. Only when
the quorum is reached is a message passed to report the fact.
To deﬁne a replication meta-object to be stacked over server and coordi-
nator meta-objects the object module
(omod REQUESTS-N-RESPONSES is
*** module importations
class Communicator |
a2c-map : A2C-Map, responses-quorums : QuorumMap,
response-recognizer : RespRecognizer .
subclass Communicator < MetaObject .
*** operator declarations and definitions
endom)
is introduced. An A2C-Map is a mapping from AId to SetOfOids. The mes-
sages of the protocol have associated a MsgType; a QuorumMap maps a MsgType
to a quorum, a MachineInt. A RespRecognizer is a set of pairs consisting of
an expected response, of sort Message, and a SetOfOids identifying those that
have sent that response. a2c-map and responses-quorums depend on the pa-
rameters n and t of the system; response-recognizer is initially empty, and
it is built and modiﬁed as messages move up and down.
The module REPLICATION-LAYER[APSS-Messages], where APSS-Messages
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is a view from REPL to REQUESTS-N-RESPONSES, speciﬁes the replication meta-
object.
4.2.3 Encryption Layer
The encryption meta-object simply encrypts every outgoing message with the
public key of the recipient, and decrypts incoming messages.
4.3 Adversaries and Compromises
This ﬁrst version of the protocol assumes passive adversaries.
class PassiveLinkAdversary | messages : SetOfMsgs .
class PassiveServerAdversary .
subclass PassiveServerAdversary < Server .
The link adversary can eavesdrop on links, while the server adversary gets ac-
cess to local information of a crashed server. Since PassiveServerAdversary
is not a subclass of ActiveServer it may not impersonate its victim. A server
compromise is modelled by a rule that replaces the meta-tower representing
the server by a PassiveServerAdversary object with the state of the server
at the time of the crash.
5 APSS with Multiple Coordinators
This second version of the protocol assumes that a coordinator too may crash
and be vulnerable to a passive server adversary. A coordinator p and a server
p are regarded as processes of the same host; one is compromised if and only if
the other is. Under this assumption there must be at least t+1 coordinators,
each of which may initiate a run.
The protocol is modiﬁed so that one of the competing runs succeeds in in-
stalling a sharing. Only the speciﬁcation of the base layer needs to be modiﬁed.
Servers act as coordinators, yet both roles are kept as independent as possi-
ble. A coordinator in this protocol is of the class ActiveCoordinatorServer,
a subclass of ActiveServer and ActiveCoordinator. A sharing label must
now identify the coordinator of the run that generated it, and sharing-label,
that of the current sharing, replaces current-version-number. Server has
an extra attribute, finished, to store the latest finished message received,
which ends a run. When a server receives a message from a coordinator of
a competing run, it will forward the stored finished message in response.
When a coordinator receives a finished message it aborts its run, and for-
wards the message to all servers. One special rule is needed to handle the case
when a coordinator has ended or aborted its run and is informing itself, as a
server, to end its run.
rl [finish-own] :
[ Conf
< C : ActiveCoordinatorServer | run-in-progress : false,
status : up, sharing-label : L,
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shares : Ss, subshares : SSs,
runs : (C, L’, old-n-new) U Rs, finished : FM >
( C <| C |< finished(L) ) ]
=> [ Conf
< C : ActiveCoordinatorServer |
finished : C |< finished(L), runs : emptySetOfRuns,
shares : Ss >-[ L ], subshares : SSs >- > ] .
6 Defending Against Active-Link Adversaries
The next version of the protocol defends against active link adversaries. These
can insert, modify, delete, reorder or replay messages. The most diﬃcult
against which to defend is the deletion of messages. This section sketches
very brieﬂy elements of the speciﬁcation of this version.
This version assumes fair links. All messages sent might not be delivered,
but if inﬁnitely many are sent, inﬁnitely many are correctly delivered. To
approximate reliable links for multicasts [6] introduces the group-send primi-
tive. A group-send(p,m, ack, d) by p is deﬁned as follows. For any server q, p
constructs a message m for q, which it repeatedly sends to q. When q receives
the message, it sends back ack(m) to p. This group-send terminates when
p receives d acknowledgments, or when it receives a finished message from
another run. For example, the init message sent by the coordinator to all
servers (see page 6) is acknowledged by contribute messages. Here identical
messages are sent to all servers. This primitive is also used when messages of
the same type are tailored for each recipient, as the establish messages sent
to all servers are (see page 6), which require t+ 1 acknowledgments.
The speciﬁcation of this protocol requires modiﬁcations to the base and
replication layers of the last version. New protocol messages are introduced to
serve as acknowledments, and the replication layer must allow for the resend-
ing of messages. The ﬁlter in the replication layer, must not only recognize
acknowledgments, but also have a timer per message group, and store the
messages, so they can be resent if necessary. Ideas for the treatment of time
for object-oriented systems in [5] and the use of timers in [3] can be used.
7 Correctness Criteria
The asynchronous proactive secret-sharing protocol has three correctness re-
quirements: secrecy, the secret remains unknown to adversaries; availability,
correct servers collectively have enough shares to reconstruct the secret; and
progress, every run eventually terminates, meaning that the correct servers
eventually delete the shares of the previous run.
Predicates for availability and secrecy are deﬁned as follows:
op the-secret : -> Secret .
ops is-available is-secret : Configuration -> Bool .
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op all-secrets : SetOfShares -> SetOfSecrets .
eq is-available(Conf)
= the-secret in all-secrets(servers-shares(Conf)) .
eq is-secret(Conf)
= not(the-secret in all-secrets(adversaries-shares(Conf))) .
servers-shares(Conf) is the set of all shares and subshares held by active
servers; adversaries-shares is the analogous set for adversaries. There
are three representations for sharings, depending on whether a sharing was
obtained from a split; from the refreshment process; or was installed at the
end of a run. all-secrets transforms a set of secrets by recursively recovering
secrets from sharings.
8 Search Strategy for a Layered Specification
The availability and secrecy correctness criteria of the APSS protocol are
violated if there exists some run of the protocol in which at some point the
servers cannot recover the secret or the adversaries can. Maude is a reﬂective
language that supports an arbitrary number of metalevels. Any speciﬁcation
can be meta-represented at the next metalevel, and thus manipulated from it.
In particular, Maude can be used to specify strategies, speciﬁcations to control
the rewriting process. This section considers some of the properties of the
speciﬁcation of the APSS protocol. It motivates and describes a strategy that
exhaustively generates all computations of a speciﬁcation with such properties,
which can be used to formally analyze the protocol by searching for runs that
violate the availability or secrecy property.
8.1 Exhaustive Search
The complete speciﬁcation of a protocol consists of the speciﬁcation of the pro-
tocol itself, the actions and messages of the intended participants, augmented
by the speciﬁcation of the environment in which it must operate, and of the
properties it guarantees. All three components can be speciﬁed by rewrite
theories, with a property being speciﬁed negatively by rules that detect and
in some way capture a state that violates it. A computation is a sequence of
rewrite rule applications. Then, a protocol can be formally analyzed by gener-
ating all computations from a given initial state, and searching for those that
end with application of some rule that speciﬁes the violation of a guaranteed
property.
8.2 Simpliﬁcation for a Benign Environment
APSS is parameterized by n, the number of servers, and t, the threshold of
compromises. A particular (n, t) instantiation of APSS is formally analyzed
by an exhaustive search of the computation tree rooted in the initial state
for the instantiation. In this state each server holds a standard share si, of
233
Rodrıguez
some initial sharing of the maintained secret, for each i in its index set. For
the ﬁrst version of the protocol there are n servers and one coordinator. For
the second, there are n principals, of which at least t + 1 are servers that
act as coordinators. The initial state has neither adversaries, nor messages.
Thus, for both versions the initial state is a conﬁguration of three-meta-object
towers.
Both protocols assume a benign environment in which adversaries may
only access local information from crashed servers. Under this assumption
encryption is unnecessary. Thus, the search space may be reduced somewhat
by having initial states with two-meta-object towers, with no encryption meta-
objects.
8.3 Canonical Form of Computations
A computation is a sequence of transitions, which for a system speciﬁed in
Maude are rewrite rule applications. In concurrent systems some transitions
are incomparable, resulting in some spuriously distinguished computations.
The problem with an exhaustive search is that of combinatorial explosion.
Therefore, it is important to minimize these artiﬁcial distinctions.
Definition 1 Transitions τ and τ ′ are incomparable if whenever s τ→ t and
s
τ ′→ t′ there exists a state s′ such that t τ ′→ s′ and t′ τ→ s′.
t
s′
t′
s

✠
❅
❅❘
❅
❅❘

✠
τ
τ ′
τ ′
τ
Thus, transitions that change disjoint substates are incomparable.
A meta-object has the four communication attributes in, out, up and
down, and possibly other attributes. An internal transition of a meta-object
changes only the state of that meta-object. For secret-sharing and replication
meta-objects, the internal transitions either consume a single element of one
of the importing attributes (in, up), or produce new elements of its exporting
attributes (down, out). Communication transitions, which are applications
of rules in, out, up and down (see [2]), are complementary to internal meta-
object transitions with respect to the communication attributes: the ones
produce where the others consume, and vice versa. Applications of rules up
and down transfer data between adjacent meta-objects in a meta-stack; up,
from attribute out to attribute up; down, from attribute down to attribute
in. Applications of rules in and out, in turn, transfer data between the top
meta-object of a meta-object tower and the surrounding conﬁguration; in,
from the conﬁguration into the in attribute; out, from the out attribute to
the conﬁguration.
Proposition 1 Let i, io, io′ be internal transitions of secret-sharing or repli-
cation meta-objects, where the subscripts identify a meta-object and o′ 
= o.
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Let c, c′ be communication transitions. Then

✠
❅
❅❘
❅
❅❘

✠
i
c
c
i

✠
❅
❅❘
❅
❅❘

✠
c
c′
c′
c

✠
❅
❅❘
❅
❅❘

✠
io
io′
io′
io
To reduce the search space a canonical order is imposed on some of the
incomparable transitions. Let ss and r denote internal secret-sharing and
replication transitions, and in, out , up and down denote applications of rules
in, out, up and down. Then
in out r ≺ up ≺ down ≺ ss
The initial state is assumed to have all communication attributes of all meta-
objects empty. Therefore, this order amounts to a policy of immediate delivery.
8.4 APSS Replication Layer is Church-Rosser
The behavior of the replication layer is described by four conditional rules.
Two consume upward-moving messages; two, downward-moving messages;
and in each pair the condition of one rule is the negation of the condition of
the other. Thus, any message consumed by a replication meta-object deter-
mines a unique transition. The application of a replication rule may produce
zero or more messages to be exported up, down or in both directions, enabling
out and down transitions, with the out transitions enabling in transitions by
other replication meta-objects. In an APSS instantiation of the parameterized
replication layer only the Filter attribute may have its value changed. It is
implemented as a set of tuples. An upward-moving message may add a new
tuple to the ﬁlter. A downward-moving message may replace a tuple, just to
change a component that is a count of downward-moving messages. Since im-
porting attributes (in and up) are multisets, and downward-moving messages
may only change the value of a count, internal transitions of a meta-object
are incomparable.
Proposition 2 Let ro and r
′
o be internal transitions of an APSS replication
meta-object o. Then


✠
❅
❅
❅❘
❅
❅
❅❘


✠
r′o ro
ro r
′
o
From Propositions 1 and 2 it follows by induction that an APSS replication
layer is Church-Rosser.
Proposition 3 Let s
τ1→ · · · τk→ t and s τ
′
1→ · · · τ
′
l→ t′ be sequences of transitions
that change the state of APSS replication meta-objects. Then there exist state
s′ and sequences t
τk+1→ · · · τn→ s′ and t′ τ
′
l+1→ · · · τ
′
m→ s′.
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8.5 Hiding a Layer
The availability and secrecy properties are predicates on the state of the secret-
sharing layer. Therefore, the computation tree that needs to be explored is
the one whose nodes are states of the secret-sharing layer. The transitions of
the replication layer should be hidden.
Given a state of the secret-sharing layer, a child in the computation tree is
obtained by the application of an internal secret-sharing rule, or the immedi-
ate delivery of a message sent, which hides the replication transitions. Since
the replication layer is Church-Rosser, it is convenient to use the function
meta-rewrite of the predeﬁned module META-LEVEL. This function takes
a Module M , a Term T and an integer n, and uses a default, fair strategy to
obtain a Term T ′. For n = 0, the resulting T ′ cannot be further rewritten. In
order to provide meta-rewrite with an appropriate module for this purpose
the speciﬁcation is modiﬁed as described below.
8.6 Conﬁguration Layers
As speciﬁed, the state of an APSS instantiation is a conﬁguration that has two-
meta-object towers. Since the transitions that move messages up and down
the towers, and in and out of the conﬁguration should be hidden during the
exhaustive search, the meta-object towers are disassembled. For the search
the state is represented by a replication conﬁguration and a secret-sharing
conﬁguration. The replication conﬁguration has the replication meta-objects.
The secret-sharing conﬁguration has the adversary objects and the secret-
sharing meta-objects for servers and coordinators. A node in the computation
tree is a term of the form Tss  Tr, where Tss and Tr are meta-representations
of the secret-sharing and replication conﬁgurations.
Tr remains unchanged by internal secret-sharing transitions. The hidden
transitions are triggered when a message is sent. The rule up is replaced by a
pair of rules: up>, which initiates the transfer of a conﬁguration request from
the secret-sharing conﬁguration by exporting it from a meta-object into the
conﬁguration. A counterpart rule <up for the replication conﬁguration imports
it from the conﬁguration into a meta-object. New syntax is introduced for
the inter-conﬁguration transfer, which pairs the conﬁguration request with
an object id to identify matching meta-objects in both conﬁgurations. The
application of these matching rules is mediated by a metalevel operation that
extracts this message from the secret-sharing conﬁguration and inserts it into
the replication conﬁguration. Similarly, rule down is replaced by the replication
layer rule <down and the secret-sharing layer down>, which are mediated by a
metalevel operation to transfer any messages being sent from the replication
conﬁguration to the secret-sharing conﬁguration. Matching applications of
out and in are replaced by applications of a new rule <out<in.
Given modules Mss and Mr that specify the secret-sharing and replica-
tion layers of the original speciﬁcation, modules for the analysis can be ob-
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tained from them by including the new communication rules: M∗ss = Mss +
(up>, down>), M∗r = Mr + (<up, <down, <out<in) − (<up, <down, <in, <out).
Some details are given in the Appendix.
9 Conclusion
Some versions of the asynchronous proactive secret-sharing protocol have been
described. The speciﬁcation has been factored into three layers: secret-
sharing, replication and encryption. A general parameterized layer for the
replication of messages and collection of quorums of responses was instanti-
ated for an (n, t) instantiation of the APSS protocol. A strategy that exploits
the structure of the speciﬁcation to reduce the search space was developed.
Thousands of complete runs of length 40 are found, none shorter. Since
the period of vulnerability is the duration of two consecutive runs, a search
tree should be at least of depth 80. Thus, further ways of reducing the space
search will be sought. This work was done using Maude 1.0.5. Continuing
work will exploit the more powerful features of newer versions of Maude in
better analysis techniques and a more complete speciﬁcation of the protocol.
A Appendix
Syntax for inter-conﬁguration messages
op up‘(_‘)>_ : ConfReq Oid -> ConfReq .
op down‘(_‘)>_ : Msg Oid -> Msg .
Communication rules for the secret-sharing conﬁguration:
rl [up>] :
[ Conf < O : MetaObject | out : CR .*. CRl, base : B > ]
=> [ Conf < O : MetaObject | out : CRl > (up( CR ) > B) ] .
rl [down>] :
[ Conf < O : MetaObject | in : MConf, base : B >
(down( M ) > B) ]
=> [ Conf < O : MetaObject | in : MConf M > ] .
Communication rules for the replication conﬁguration:
rl [<down] :
[ Conf < O : MetaObject | down : M .*. Ml, base : B > ]
=> [ Conf < O : MetaObject | down : Ml > (down(M) > B) ] .
rl [<up] :
[ Conf < O : MetaObject | up : CRConf, base : B >
(up( CR ) > B) ]
=> [ Conf < O : MetaObject | up : CRConf CR > ] .
rl [<out<in] :
[ Conf < O : MetaObject | base : B, in : MConf >
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< O’ : MetaObject | out : (B <| M) .*. CRl > ]
=> [ Conf < O : MetaObject | base : B, in : MConf M >
< O’ : MetaObject | out : CRl > ] .
Syntax for the meta-representation of the state as a pair of conﬁgurations.
protecting TUPLE(2)[Term, Term]
* (sort Tuple[Term, Term] to Layered-Term,
op ‘(_‘,_‘) to _#_,
op p1_ to ss._ ,
op p2_ to r._ ) .
subsort Layered-Term < Term .
Given a state T, the state resulting from the application of an internal
secret-sharing transition speciﬁed by a rule labelled by L:
extTerm(meta-apply(Mss, ss. T, L, none, 0)) # r. T.
Operations for the extraction of objects, up and down messages from con-
ﬁgurations:
ops o^_ u^_ d^_ : Term -> Term .
Operation for combining conﬁgurations:
op ^ : -> Term .
op _&_ : Term Term -> Term [assoc comm id: ^] .
Implementation of immediate delivery:
eq deliver(Mss, Mr, T) = r>ss(Mss, r(Mr, ss>r(Mss, Mr, T))) .
eq ss>r(Mss, Mr, T)
= o^(extTerm(meta-apply(Mss, ss. T, ’up>, none, 0)))
# ( r. T
& u^(extTerm(meta-apply(Mss, ss. T, ’up>, none, 0)))) .
eq r(Mr, T) = ss. T # meta-rewrite(Mr, r. T, 0) .
eq r>ss(Mss, T) = d>>(Mss, (ss. T) & (d^ r. T)) # o^ r. T .
eq d>>(Mss, T)
= if extTerm(meta-apply(Mss, T, ’down>, none, 0)) == error*
then T
else d>>(Mss, extTerm(meta-apply(Mss, T, ’down>, none, 0)))
fi .
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